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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEPHEN CURRIER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
Case No. 920467-CA

v.
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden,

Priority No. 2

Respondent-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. This Court has jurisdiction to
hear

the appeal

pursuant

to Utah

Code Ann. section 78-2a-

3(2)(g)(Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

IS THE THREE MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
OF UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-12-31.1 (1992) A
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL LIMITATION?

II.

DID THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PROPERLY DISMISS THE PETITION BASED ON
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF SECTION 7812-31.1?
STANDARD OF APPFT.T.ATE PEVTRW

In considering an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, no deference is accorded the lower court's
conclusions of law that underlie the dismissal of the petition.
1

Rather, the Court reviews such determinations for correctness.
Termunde v. Cook, 786 P. 2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990) (citing Fernandez
v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented is
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 3, 1988, petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual abuse
of a child, a second degree felony.
District Court,

See Case No. 2434, Seventh

On April 3, 1989, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell

sentenced petitioner to eighteen months probation.

The court

further sentenced him to serve six months in the Carbon County Jail
as a condition of his probation. Id.. Petitioner's two attempts to
withdraw

his

guilty

plea

were

unsuccessful.

(R.

61-62).

Pe*- - tioner filed an appeal which he ultimately abandoned, against
the advice of his counsel. (JEd.. ) . Petitioner's codefendant in the
underlying criminal matter executed an affidavit on October 21
19 91 in which he recanted his damning testimony against petitioner.
Br. of App. at 7-8. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus

on

ineffective

April

16, 1992,

assistance

of

some

counsel

six months
with

later, claiming

respect

to

agreement and sentencing. (R. 2). Br. of App. at 6.

the plea
The State

filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations
References to the "State" are to the respondent warden.
2

contained in Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-31.1 (1992).

The trial

court granted the State's motion to dismiss on June 12, 1992, and
the final order was entered on June 22, 1992. (R. 88-90).
This Court denied summary disposition on August 31, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioner filed his brief, claiming that:

1) the

district court improperly dismissed his petition pursuant to the
three-month

statute

of

limitations;

and

2)

the

statute

of

limitations is unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A statement of facts beyond those set forth in the above
Statement of the Case is not necessary to resolve the issues
presented on appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The three-month statute of limitations contained in Utah Code
Ann. section 78-12-31.1 (1992) is a constitutionally permissible
procedural limitation under the Utah Constitution.

This section

does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but merely procedurally
limits the time period when a petition may be filed.

The writ

remains available to any person who acts diligently and files a
claim within the specified time-frame.
Moreover, section 78-12-31.1 does not violate Article VIII,
section 4 of the Utah Constitution.

That provision grants the Utah

Supreme Court the authority to establish procedural court rules.
Section 78-12-31.1 is not a rule of procedure, but a statute that
procedurally limits the filing of habeas petitions.
3

Therefore,

section 78-12-31.1 is not governed by Article VIII, section 4.
Additionally, Article VI, section

1

of the Utah Constitution

grants the Utah Legislature the power to create the laws governing
the

State

of

constitutional

Utah.

Therefore,

legislative

section

78-12-31.1

enactment, pursuant

is

a

to Article VI,

section 1.
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, section 78-12-31.1 allows
for excusable delay, since it is a procedural bar only as to
grounds a petitioner should have been aware of through the exercise
of reasonable diligence.

The mere fact that petitioner's claims

did not fall under this condition does not mean that excusable
delay is not an available exemption.
Furthermore, section 78-12-31.1 is a reasonable time-period as
applied to petitioner's case.

Petitioner's claims were known or

should have been known to him, through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, within 90 days of his sentencing.

Therefore, section

78-12-31.1 did not unreasonably limit petitioner's ability to file
a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The foregoing demonstrates that the district court properly
dismissed petitioner's petition pursuant to section 78-12-31.1,
since petitioner filed his petition more than 36 months after his
sentencing.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE THREE-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-31.1
(1992) IS A CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL
LIMITATION.

Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-31.1 (1992) is a constitutionally
limitation under the Utah Constitution.2

permissible procedural

Section 78-12-31.1 provides that an action for habeas corpus relief
must be commenced within three months from the time the grounds are
known to petitioner, or "in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have been known to petitioner or counsel for petitioner."
Petitioner claims that the statute is an unreasonable, nonprocedural

enactment

which

violates

the

Utah

Constitution.

However, mere allegations that a statute is unconstitutional will
not

meet

the

requisite

burden

necessary

to

invalidate

it.

"[Legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of
validity and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is
no reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as conforming
to

constitutional

requirements."

City

Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990).
Legislature

is attacked

on grounds

of

Monticello

v.

"[W]hen an act of the

of unconstitutionality

the

question presented is not whether it is possible to condemn the
act, but whether it is possible to uphold it."

2

Lehi City v.

Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever ruled
on the constitutionality of section 78-12-31.1 in a majority
opinion. However, the issue is currently pending before the Utah
Supreme Court (McClellan v. Holden, Case No. 920249), and it was
briefly discussed in the concurring and dissenting opinions of
Justice Zimmerman and Justice Stewart in Smith v. Cook, 803 P. 2d
788, 796-797 (Utah 1990) .

5

Meilinq, 48 P. 530f 535 (Utah 1935).

Considering the presumptions

of statutory validity, petitioner has not established that section
73-12-31.1 violates the Utah Constitution.
A.

Section 78-12-31.1 Is A Constitutional Procedural Limitation Which
Does Not Suspend The Right To
Petition The Court For Habeas Corpus
Relief.

Petitioner claims that section 78-12-31.1 is not a procedural
limitation, implying that section 78-12-31.1 suspends the right to
petition the court for habeas relief. Article I, Section 5 of the
Utah Constitution states: "The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety requires it." The question is whether
the 90-day limitation period attached to habeas corpus proceedings
amounts

to

a

suspension

of

the

writ

of

habeas

corpus.

Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the procedural limitation
period does not suspend the writ.

Considering this very issue,

several states have found that statutes of limitation on filing
habeas corpus petitions do not "suspend" the constitutional right
to petition for habeas corpus relief.

See Bartz v. State of

Oregon, 825 P.2d 657 (Or. App. 1992); Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d
707 (Iowa 1989).

Such statutes are viewed as mere procedural

limitations which do not unconstitutionally suspend the writ.
In Bartz, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal
of a habeas petition on the ground that the petition was not timely
filed. The court held that Oregon's 120-day statute of limitations
on habeas corpus petitions did not violate Article 1, Section 23 of
6

the Oregon Constitution, which is almost identical to Article I,
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, prohibiting suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. The Oregon court concluded that the statute
of limitations imposed only procedural conditions on a claim for
post-conviction relief, and did not dilute the substance of the
writ.

Therefore, the statute of limitations did not impermissibly

suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Bartz, 825 P.2d at 660.
In another similar case, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that
its statute of limitations governing habeas corpus actions was
constitutional under the Iowa Constitution. Davis, 443 N.W.2d at
709. While the constitutions of Iowa and Utah are not identical,
they both prohibit suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The

Iowa Supreme Court first recognized that the state legislature had
authority to place reasonable time restrictions on the filing of
civil actions, and that such limitations on the right to seek a
writ of habeas corpus are constitutional under both the United
States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution. Davis, 443 N.W.2d at
709-710.

The court concluded that the statute of limitations did

not unconstitutionally suspend the right to habeas corpus relief
under the Iowa Constitution.
This Court should follow the analysis of the Iowa and the
Oregon courts and conclude that the statute of limitations is not
a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, but merely a procedural
limitation

on

when

the

right

may

be

asserted.

Attaching

a

limitation period on the time for filing a habeas petition does not
unconstitutionally suspend the writ. The writ remains available to
7

any person who acts with diligenc
time period specified by law.

and files a claim within the

Adccionally, the right to petition

is tolled indefinitely until the violation giving rise to a claim
becomes known or in the "exercise of reasonable diligence should
have

been

known."

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

78-12-31.1.

Thus,

the

provision does not bar anyone from actually filing a petition with
the courts, but merely creates a procedural bar if the petition is
not timely filed.
B.

Section 78-12-31.1 Does Not Violate
Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution.

Petitioner claims that if section 78-12-31.1 is a procedural
limitation,

it

Constitution.

violates

Article

VIII,

Section

4 of

the

Utah

Article VIII, Section 4 delineates the rule-making

power of the Utah Supreme Court, stating in pertinent part,
"[t]he Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to
be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the
appellate process."

Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4.

Petitioner claims

that Article VIII, Section 4 grants m e Utah Supreme Court the sole
power to create all procedural limitations.
argues,

if

section

78-12-31.1

is

deemed

Therefore, petitionerprocedural,

it

is

unconstitutional because it was not created by the Utah Supreme
Court.

Br. of App. at 13.

Petitioner's

argument

is

unfounded.

A

close

reading

of

Article VIII, Section 4 reveals that it grants the supreme court
only the power to adopt Court rules of procedure (e.g., Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rules of Evidence, Rules of Appellate Procedure).
8

However, section 78-12-31.1 is not a rule of procedure, but rather
a statutory provision which is procedural in nature. Since section
78-12-31.1 is a statute of limitation, rather than a rule, it does
not fall within the boundaries of Article VIII, Section 4.
Furthermore, Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution
grants the Utah Legislature the power to create the laws of the
state of Utah.

Utah Const, art. VI, § 1.

The Utah Supreme Court

has held that the legislature has every law-making power that is
not

expressly

or

impliedly

withheld

by

federal

or

state

constitution.

See State ex rel. Stain v. Christensen, 35 P.2d 775

(Utah 1934).

See also Lehi City v. Meilinq, 48 P. 2d 530 (Utah

1935).

Petitioner

fails to cite a constitutional

provision

reserving to another branch of government the power to create
statutes of
provision.

limitation, and the State is unaware of any such
Therefore, petitioner's claim lacks merit.
C.

Section
78-12-31.1
Contains
Provision For Excusable Delay.

A

Contrary to petitioner's assertions, section 78-12-31.1 allows
for excusable delay, since it is a procedural bar only as to
grounds

a petitioner

should

have

exercise of reasonable diligence."

been

aware

of

"through

the

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1.

Therefore, a petition raising issues that could not have reasonably
been discovered within 90 days will not be procedurally barred.
Whether a claim could have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence depends on the facts of each case, but the
foregoing demonstrates that section 78-12-31.1 allows for excusable
delay.

Therefore, petitioner's claim is unfounded.
9

D.

The Statute Of Limitations For
Habeas
Corpus
Actions
Is
A
Reasonable
Procedural
Limitation
Under The Facts Of This Case.

In order to be constitutional, "a statute of limitation must
allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action after a cause
of action arises."
672 (Utah 1985).
bring

a

given

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P. 2d 670,

What constitutes a reasonable amount of time to
cause

of

action

depends

upon

various

factors,

including the nature of the action, the interests of government and
the interests of the litigant. Davis, 443 N.W.2d at 710.

The mere

fact that the limitation period found in section 78-12-31.1 is
relatively

short

does

not

in

itself

create

a

presumption

of

unreasonableness.
The Oregon Court of Appeals has held that Oregon's 120-day
limitation period for bringing habeas corpus actions is reasonable.
Bartz v. State of Oregon, 825 P.2d

657

(Or. App. 1992).

The

Arizona Court of Appeals has held that a 30-day limitation period
for an action by a lessor of motor vehicles to recover license tax
was not unreasonable.
1968).

Shaw v. State, 447 P. 2d 262 (Ariz. App.

The limitation period cannot be evaluated under a generic

standard, but must be reviewed in light of the circumstances of the
case and the nature of the proceedings.
In determining the reasonableness of a specific statute of
limitations, the Court must first consider the purpose for which
the statute was created.

A core purpose for the limitation found

in section 78-12-31.1, as with all limitation periods, is to compel
the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so as to
10

avoid stale claims where evidence no longer exists and memories
have faded.

Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P. 2d at 1098 (Utah

1989) .
Under

section

78-12-31.1, individuals

who

claim

unlawful

restraint of their liberty must file a habeas action within 90 days
of discovery of the claim or the time the claim should have been
discovered. The relatively short limitation period requires prompt
action to have the legality of restraint adjudicated.

This permits

the courts to review habeas petitions while relevant evidence is
still fresh and records are available. It further promotes the
finality of the judgment
corpus

petitions

resources

and

leading up to the restraint.

brought
prevent

in

a

timely

lawfully

manner

incarcerated

Habeas

conserve

state

inmates

from

intentionally waiting years to file actions and then benefitting
from fading memories and forgotten or unobtainable witnesses. This
was the very reason the Utah Legislature enacted section 78-1231.1.

See Tr. of Senate Debate on S.B. 245 (Addendum A ) ;

House Debate on S.B. 245
intended

to

curtail

(Addendum B).

prison

inmates

Tr.

The enactment was further
from

against the State, resulting in increased

filing

belated

suits

litigation expenses,

burdens, and delays that otherwise would not be present. Id.
When
conviction

an
or

inmate

files

sentence

a

long

habeas
after

petition
its

challenging

occurrence,

as

a
in

petitioner's case, it can often result in an effective acquittal of
the underlying criminal conviction where one is not

justified.

When a conviction or sentence is invalidated by a court in a habeas
11

proceeding, the matter usually returns to the trial court for
correction of underlying error.

This may require a new trial.

However, when a long period of time has elapsed since conviction
and sentence, witnesses and evidence may be unavailable, rendering
the State unable to re-prosecute the case. Thus, the result is the
equivalent of an unjustified acquittal.
Section 78-12-31.1 also assures the State and the courts that
they can rely on the finality of their actions after a three month
period has elapsed.

Finality of judgment is not only important to

the State and agencies subject to habeas corpus review, but it is
vitally important to the victims and witnesses of criminal behavior
who desire to put the incident behind them and continue their
lives.

See Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968)

Another

factor

to

be

considered

in

determining

the

reasonableness of the 90-day limitation period, is the burden
placed

on

a

petitioner

by

the

limitation.

Habeas

corpus

proceedings are unique from other civil actions in that they
uniformly arise out of administrative and judicial proceedings
where the actions giving rise to the claim for relief are readily
ascertainable.

The

overwhelming

majority

of

habeas

corpus

petitions challenge decisions made and actions taken at trial and
sentencing, Board of Pardons' hearings, and prison disciplinary
proceedings.

Long periods of time are not necessary to formulate

the ground(s) for habeas corpus relief.
proceedings

from

which

available immediately.

relief

is

The very nature of the

sought

makes

the

claim(s)

In this sense, a habeas action is similar
12

to an appeal from a criminal conviction, where the notice of appeal
must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the
conviction.

judgment of

Any errors at trial that provide a basis for appeal

are presumed readily ascertainable, and if not challenged within 30
days, appeal of those errors is waived.
Moreover,

section

78-12-31.1

provides

relief

from

the

relatively short limitation period by specifically incorporating a
tolling provision for justifiably unknown claims.
Finally, the 90-day limitation period is reasonable given that
inmates seeking habeas relief are provided free access to competent
legal assistance by the incarcerating institution. Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817 (1977); Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397 (10th
Cir. 1987).

Inmates do not face the delays or obstacles generally

associated with locating, retaining and compensating an attorney
for legal assistance.

This enables the inmate to promptly identify

potential habeas claims and seek redress in the courts.
Under the facts of this case, the 90-day limitation period
contained in section 78-12-31.1 is reasonable.
petitioner

claimed

that

he received

In his petition,

ineffective

counsel during plea proceedings and at sentencing.
errors

providing

ascertainable

a basis

within

90

for

a habeas

days

of

petition

petitioner's

assistance of
Any alleged
were

readily

sentencing.

Therefore, the 90-day period is a reasonable procedural limitation
with respect to petitioner's case.

13

II.

THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION PURSUANT
TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CONTAINED
IN SECTION 78-12-31.1.

Petitioner was convicted on October 3, 1988 and was sentenced
on April 3, 1989.

However, petitioner did not file his habeas

petition until April 16, 1992, over thirty-six months after his
sentencing.
months late.

Petitioner's petition was approximately thirty-three
At the latest, he should have known of his claims

regarding counsel's effectiveness during the plea and sentencing
proceedings within three months after he was sentenced.
Even petitioner's claim that Raymond Marquez recanted his
incriminating testimony is untimely.

Marquez's affidavit was

notarized on October 28, 1991. Thus, petitioner should have raised
this

claim

demonstrates

no

later
that

than

the

January

district

28, 1992.
court

The

properly

foregoing
dismissed

petitioner's petition as time-barred pursuant to section 78-1231.1.
CONCLUSION
Section 78-12-31.1 is a permissible procedural limitation
under the Utah Constitution.
habeas

corpus, but merely

petition may be filed.

It does not suspend the writ of

limits the time-period

in which a

Section 78-12-31.1 also does not violate

Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution since it is not a
rule of procedure.
The 90-day limitation allows for excusable delay by barring
only those claims which should have been discovered through the
14

exercise of reasonable diligence.

Furthermore, the statute is

reasonable as applied to petitioner's case. Petitioner should have
been aware of the grounds for his petition within 90 days of his
sentencing.

Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the

petition as time-barred pursuant to section 78-12-31.1.
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the dismissal
of the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/

day of December, 1992.

7?/ vsus

ANGELA F. MICKLOS
Assistant Attorney General
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hereby
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and
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CERTIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE TRANSCRIPT

I hereby certify that the attached document consisting of
six (6) signed pages is a true and authentic copy of the Utah State
Senate floor debate of Senate Bill No. 245, 1979 General
Legislative Session, Disk No. 296, dated March 3, 1979.

Name

7

Title

V
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DOCKET CLERK:

245

Senate Bill No. 245 Habeas Corpus Time

Limitations. There is a report, Mr. President. Tour committee on
Judiciary, to which was referred Senate Bill No. 245, Habeas Corpus
Time Limitations, by Senator Barlow, has carefully considered the
bill and reports the same out favorably, with the recommendation
that the original bill be deleted in body and title and Substitute
Senate Bill No. 245 be inserted in lieu thereof.

Respectfully,

Senator Asay, Committee Chairman.
SENATOR ASAY: Mr. President.
PRESIDENT FERRY:
SENATOR ASAY:

I move the option of the committee report.

PRESIDENT FERRY:
Oppose?

Senator Asay.

All in favor of motion say I? (VOTE TAKEN)

(VOTE TAKEN) Motion carried.

Senate bill 245 is before

us.
SENATOR BARLOW:

Mr. President

PRESIDENT FERRY:

Senator.

SENATOR BARLOW:

Mr. President, the purpose of this bill,

Senate bill 245, does two things. One denotes the first part where
it says within three months, within 90 days.

What it simply means

is that it eliminates a device that is often utilized by defense
counsel in post-conviction remedies, in order to use a series of
habeas corpus actions, both there in the State and in the Federal
Courts, to delay the eventual carrying out of the sentence of the
Court. Now we are talking about once the conviction is made, then
the device now is to show that for some reason the trial was ah not
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Mr. President
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Senator.

SENATOR BARLOW:

Mr. President, the purpose of this bill,

Senate bill 245, does two things. One denotes the first part where
it says within three months, within 90 days.

What it simply means

is that it eliminates a device that is often utilized by defense
counsel in post-conviction remedies, in order to use a series of
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ah handled properly.

Now this change is required of both parties

who represent the defendant and who seek to use a habeas corpus,
would be required in order to successfully use that legal postconviction remedy, would only do so on grounds known to them, but
would only do so that this was new information and that in ah that
they should have known about it or should have been aware of it
prior to this period because, two particular cases comes to my mind
is the Hi-Fi case, in Ogden, and a motor cycle case up there in
Carbon county.
This is what often happens is that the defense attorney will
know of grounds to postpone the carrying out of the conviction but
they won't say anything about it until after the trial. And it is
not a case where the person might be innocent or guilty. That has
already been determined. Now this becomes a delaying tactic. And
then they throw in something that they had already known and should
have brought before the court, but they didn't bring it before the
court because it is very obvious that the party was guilty.

And

so, they throw one thing at you, and then you wait about a year
till it has gone through its various channels, now you are about
ready to carry out the sentence, and then they throw another thing
at you until this thing is delayed, not only a year but two years
and three years. Now the question is, . . . what this will do is,
that it simple means that within ninety days, if you have anything
that you had already known about but didn't say anything about, a
reasonable person would have known, then you can't use that as
evidence•
Now the next, now this is just on the habeas corpus. Now, I

am not an attorney and any of these attorneys could probably cut me
to pieces if they want to.
Ms. Dunner, do we have a quorum? Mr. President?

I don't want

to talk to myself.
PRESIDENT FERRY:

You actually calling the Senate?

SENATOR BARLOW:

Well, if we vote on it, it doesn't make a

difference but if its gonna to be • . .
PRESIDENT FERRY:
SENATOR BARLOW:

If there is not a quorum present a . . .
They ought to have . . .

PRESIDENT FERRY:

We'll ask the Sergeant at Arms to require

the Senators to take their seats. Please.
PRESIDENT FERRY:
SENATOR RENSTROM:

Senator Renstrom.
Senator Barlow asked me if I would say a

word on this bill, and I would like to.
PRESIDENT FERRY:
SENATOR RENSTROM:

Go ahead even though nobody is listening.
I do considerable, . . . that's usually

the case when I speak. I do a little bit of defense work, criminal
defense work, not an awfully lot. But, I would write in support of
this bill.
I think sometimes the appeal process is abused, and as I
understand this bill, and I am not terrible optimistic this is
going to solve all our problems but certainly it's not going to
solve all our appellate problems before Federal Courts.

But

certainly at the conclusion of a trial, if the lawyer feels that
there is something wrong with the trail or that there is something
wrong with the law, that all of those should be attacked in an
immediate appeal and not use sequential attacks one after the

other, and completing one attack, loosing, and then taking another
attack, then loosing, but ultimately loosing only after years and
years of expensive litigation.

This bill I think would help to

cure and put the responsibility on the lawyers and the defendants
who are convicted to attack the trial, the law or what ever else
that's loyal to them.
Now Senator Barlow has built into this, I think an important
safeguard, and that is that should there be newly found evidence or
some other unusual circumstances, at the last minute, that would
justify a higher court looking at it, of course that higher court
could.
bill.

So I rise in support of the bill.

I think it is a good

It is not going to solve all the problems, that is certain,

but I think it is a major step in the right direction.

Thank you,

Mr. President.
PRESIDENT FERRYt
SENATOR ASAY:

Senator Asay.

Mr. President, could I ask probably Senator

Renstrom, who is a member of the bar, a question here?

As I told

you, I don't understand the legal jargon, but I understand plain
English. So in just plain English, what do the words habeas corpus
mean?
SENATOR RENSTROMt

Habeas corpus means to free the body.

In

other words, if you're in jail, I go down and get a writ of habeas
corpus saying your body is unlawfully held, and a writ of habeas
corpus would be to free your body from being unlawfully held.
SENATOR ASAYs

Free the body or produce the body.

SENATOR RENSTROMi
SENATOR ASAY;

Produce the body.

Get you out of jail? (laughter)

£*** LJ,~/£

SENATOR RENSTROM:
SENATOR ASAY:

Get you out of jail. Right.

If it means produce the body then instead of

calling for a call of the Senate, we could just say habeas corpus,
(laughter)

Anyway, I want to speak in favor of this bill.

A

recent KSL editorial made the point that the Hi-Fi killers, for
instance, that there has never been a question as to their quilt
and the defendant had the due process of the law, but they've gone
on an on. And the dollar figure now has exceeded a half a million
dollars,

and

they're

still

going

on

and

these

so

called

technicalities where new evidences is being produced, and I think
injustice is being done.

So, I support this bill one hundred

percent.
SENATOR RENSTROM:
parting in comment.

Mr. President, may I please just make one

Sometimes, and I feel too often, lawyers are

disabused because they paint the law that is available to them and
do all they possibly can on behalf of their clients.

I remember

hearing a very well known international lawyer say once, "The
reason lawyers seem to be distrusted or disliked is simply because
they represent people."

Now I do not fault any lawyer for doing

his job, even if it might appear at times to the public that he is
abusing the process.

If you were charged with the responsibility

of representing an individual, you must realize how trauma ridden
you

feel

sometime when

the

family

is

there, and you

responsibility to the client as well as to the public.

feel

And I am

pleased with the editorials that the newspapers have made in
regards to some of these cases, where they seem to go on for ever,
and they are saying, "Don't blame the lawyer, blame the system."

/Z.- -
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This bill, I think, will be a step in the right direction to help
correct the system.
PRESIDENT FERRY:

If there's no more discussion?

Answer, a

question?
SENATOR BARLOW:

Mr. President, I was wondering if the body

felt pretty good about this bill if we could maybe get a motion to
get it to the House or of any single person or Senator would like
to hold it up I would be glad to just move to third reading
calendar. If there is no objection, then I would like to move that
we consider it read for the second or third time and up for final
passage.
PRESIDENT FERR7:

Senator Barlow moves that Senate Bill 244

[245] under suspension of rules be read for the second and third
time and up for final passage.

All in favor, say I.

Opposed.

Motion carries, and we will call for role call vote.

(Where as role call was taken as reported on page 1195 attached)

PRESIDENT FERRY:

Senate Bill No. 245 final passage received

26 Ayes, no Nays, and three absents. Having been approved, will be
sent to the house for their consideration.

**Voting recorded on page 1195 of the Senate Journal, dated
Saturday, March 3, 1979 (attached).

/ % e ^ ^

Doyl

JOURNAL

•jj% 55

Saturday, March 3, 1979

1195

V Bangerter, et ah, has carefully considered said bill and reports same
\ favorably.

line.
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Page 8, Line 15 the $100 amountl

C

I.

Ronald T. Halverson
Committee Chairman

i reading on the following roll catt&
*
*

committee report read and adopted.

*
?ere: Senators
Sowards
*
Swan
Waddingham
Wayment
^
Mr. President (Ferry)!'

re: Senators
ten
Matheson
ex
Pace
Sandberg

I
* •

»re: Senators

S.B. No. 329 then passed second and third reading on the following
' call: ^
Yeas, 26; Nays, 0; Absent, 3
Voting in the c r nrmative were: Senators
Farley
Pugh
Finlinson
Renstrom
:N inserter
Halverson
Snow
flirlow
;
Jeffs
Sowards
i .11 k
Jensen
Swan
\\ »\\on
Jones
•: ilU-n
Waddingham
Kimball
Bunnell
Wayment
« • n^tensen
Matheson
Mr. President (Ferry)
• -rnaby
Pace

Cornaby
Absent and not voting were: Senators
run
Carling
Sandberg

re

d to the House.

S.B. No. 329 was transmitted to the House.
tf)ING CALENDAR
erter the rules were suspended with no
29, INSTITUTIONALIZED ELDERLY
cond and third times and placed on final

On motion of Senator Barlow the rules were suspended w4th no
anting votes, and S.B. No. 245, HABEAS CORPUS TIME LIMITA< >.\S, was read the second and third times and placed on final passage.

February 28,1979

February 27, 1979
r President:

Services to which was referred S.B. No.
1LDERLY OMBUDSMAN, by Mr. Ja*j

1

:

Your Committee on Judiciary, to which was referred S.B. No. 245,
i \ HEAS CORPUS TIME LIMITATIONS, by Mr. Haven J. Barlo*, has

»W

SENATE JOURNAL
— -

55

Days-

carefully considered said bill and reports the same out favorably, w;tthe recommendation that the original bill be deleted in body and tit,
and Substitute S.B. No. 245 be inserted in lieu thereof.

Saturday, Ma

MOVEMENTS ACCOUNT, by Mr.
fcDy considered said bill and report!
following amendments:
Page 1, Line 16:
delete "$500,000" and in*

Respectfully,
E. Verl Aaay
Committee Chairman

Page 5, Line 26:
delete "$500,000/' and ins

Committee report read and adopted and Substitute S.B. No. 2V
replaced the original bill.
Substitute S.B. No. 245 then passed second and third reading
the following roll call:
Committee report, as amended,

Yeas, 26; Nays, 0; Absent, 3
Voting in the affirmative were: Senators
Asayv
ru
L..
_
Cornaby
Renstrom
Bangerter
Farley
Sandberg
Barlow
Finlinson
Snow
Black
Jeffs
Sowards
Bowen
Jensen
Swan
Bullen
Jones
Waddingham
Bunnell
Kimball
Wayment
Carling
Matheson
Mr. President (Fern
Christensen
Pugh

Senator Finlinson proposed ame
On motion of Senator Finlinson i
155 circled on Second Reading Caller

On motion of Senator Jones th
wanting votes, and S.B. No. 183 WJ
•*d Placed on final passage.

Absent and not voting were: Senators
Barton
Halverson
Pace
Substitute S.B. No. 245 was transmitted to the House.
• • •

uvSS N a " ^ E ? E R G Y CONSERVATION CAPITAL IMPROVE
MEMS, was read the second time.
February 27,19"
Mr. President:
Your Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, to which **'
referred S.B. No. 155, ENERGY CONSERVATION CAPITAL 1»

^

President:

Your Committee on Social Servic
*W» MEDICAL BENEFITS RECO1
***•» et al., has carefully considered
^arably with the following amendi
page 4, Line 33:
insert the following as nei
"(4) The department must
bility to the third party or
identification number, diag
itemized charges, so the ca

A D D E N D U M

B

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
STATE OF UTAH
31 a STATE CAPITOL • aALT LAKE CITY Bd 114

1979 GENERAL SESSION
43rd LEGISLATURE, STATE OF UTAH

S.B. No. 245 PROBATE CODE AMENDMENTS
By Sanator Havan J. Barlow

I haraby cartify that tha attachad tranacript, ia a varbatim racord of
tha diacuaaion ragarding S.B. No. 245, LIMITATIONS-HABEAS CORPUS AND
POST-CONVICTION AND REMEDIES, by Sanator Havan J. Barlow, which occurrad in
tha Houaa Chaxnbar on March 7, 1979, and ia racordad on Racord #5 lina 5 in tha
Houaa Offica.

Lida Hammond
Ltaialativa Aida

Data cartifiad

TRANSCRIPTS OF HOUSE DEBATE ON SENATE BILL MO. 245
MARCH 7. 1979
LIMITATIONS - HABEAS CORPUS AND POST-CONVICTION AND REMEDIES
MR. SPEAKER (HANSEN)i

Senator Bangerter.

REPRESENTATIVE BANGERTER:
move

245 to

Mr. Speaker, I would move that we

the head of the third

reading

calendar.

The

representative that's here to handle that bill has an appointment
with the court in about twenty minutes.

It is such a short bill.

I think we can handle that, and I would make that motion.
MR. SPEAKER: You saying that may keep him here an hour. You
heard the motion.

All members in favor say, "I." (VOTE TAKEN)

Those opposed say No. (VOTE TAKEN) Motion carried. Representative
Rawson.
REPRESENTATIVE RAWSON:

I have a substitute motion.

Mr.

Speaker I was . . .
MR. SPEAKER:
motion.

Representative, I have already ruled on that

I am sorry.

SENATOR RAWSON:

What motion?

MR. SPEAKER: The motion to move 245 to the head of the third
reading calendar and consider it. The motion was placed.
seconded.

It was

The vote was called for and passed.

SENATOR RAWSON:

Well, how about that, (laughter)

MR. SPEAKER: Representative, would you read that in. Madame
Reading Clerk has that been read in?
READING CLERK:
MR. SPEAKER:

(inaudible).

Would you read it in please?

READING CLERK:

Substitute Senate Bill No. 245, Limitations-

Habeas Corpus and Post-conviction and Remedies, by Senator Haven J.
Barlow, being enacted by the legislature of the State of Utah.
MR. SPEAKER:

Representative Sykes.

REPRESENTATIVE SYKES: Thank you very much Mr. Speaker. And I
do appreciate your indulgence in this. Fellow Representatives, I
got a little problem here.
angry Judge.

You've never faced the wrath of an

Let me say, ah, just briefly about this bill. Many

of you will recall the facts of a rather brutal and notorious
murder that occurred in this state, in the city of Ogden, in April
1974, where ah two individuals brutally raped a young girl, shot
her to death, poured Draino down the throat of a young man, and he
remains maned to this day, killed two other individuals, and ah
shot shot [sic] one other and left him for dead.

Ah, this was

known as the Hi-Fi murder case. The trial on this matter occurred
in the fall of 1974, about October.

Trial lasted for five weeks.

The defendants in this case has two, ah, three of the best criminal
attorneys in the state of Utah. Ah, the appeal in this matter was
decided in December 1977. Many of you have wondered, perhaps from
time to time, why some of these notorious murder cases, why ah the
defendants who have been sentenced to death, ah three, sometimes
three and five years ago, remain unexecuted and justice remains
unexecuted to this day. And the reason is a little ah thing of the
law known as habeas corpus.
Now habeas corpus is a constitutional

challenge to any

proceeding which leads to an individuals confinement.

And the

tactic of ah many criminal defense attorneys has been, long after
the trial is over, long after the appeal is over, to file a habeas

corpus petition, sometimes right before the execution is or has
been scheduled.

A good example of this was in the case of Gary

Gilmore, where a habeas corpus petition was filed on ah at 7:00
p.m. on Sunday night, when execution was scheduled for Monday
morning. And this puts a tremendous burden on the State of Utah in
responding to these matters. Ah. It ah is a almost impossible to
do and often times, ah a almost always, the habeas corpus petition
is based upon matters which were known or should have been known to
the ah defendants and their attorneys, sometimes years before. But
yet, they bring them up at the last minute. And the purpose of it
is to simply to delay the execution of justice.
Now, Substitute Senate Bill No. 245 is a bill that places a
statute of limitation upon ah habeas corpus petitions for matters
that they either knew or should have been known, and it's within
three months of when the the [sic] defense either knew or should
have known of the alleged defects in the trial. Ah. A second part
of that says, ah, in subsection (2) there, that no post-conviction
remedy, which would include others other than habeas corpus, may be
applied for or entertained by the Court within the 30 days prior to
the scheduled execution, on grounds that they knew or should have
known prior to that date.

So this will, this will, do away with

what's been known as a charade in the run of the law.

Just a

charade and a mockery of justice in bringing these last minute
appeals based upon frivolous grounds.

I would be happy to answer

any questions. Other than that, I'd urge your favorable support of
the bill that's past 26 to zero in the Senate.
the knell of death in this body.

I hope that's not

But, it's a very good bill, and

it will help to put some sense into our judicial process in this
state.
MR. SPEAKER:

Thank you.

Mow to the bill.

Representative

Davis.
REPRESENTATIVE DAVIS: Mr. Speaker, a number of years ago, the
Supreme Court found the Capital punishment to be unconstitutional,
and the following morning, I introduced the capital punishment bill
here in the House at 10:00. Later that afternoon, about 1:00, as
I recall, a police officer was shot to death on Salt Lake City
streets.

The first time in 20 some years, I guess.

Later the

Criminal Code revision incorporated all of that, and we do have the
capital punishment bill in our statutes.
I stand in support of Bob Sykes bill here today, and I hope
that all of us will support this measure.
MR. SPEAKER:

Thank you.

Representative Richards?

I see no

further life sign, do you want to sum up?
REPRESENTATIVE SYKES:

Thank you very much, I urge your

favorable support of this bill.
MR. SPEAKER:

Voting is now opened on Senate Bill No. 245.

Would you quickly vote.
MR. SPEAKER:

It appears to the chair that all present have

voted on this bill. Voting will now be closed.

Senate bill 245,

having received 55 affirmative votes, and 5 negative votes has
passed this house and shall be signed in open session.
The foregoing, Senate bill 245, was publicly read by title and
immediately thereafter signed by the speaker of the house, in the
presents of the house, over which presides and the fact at this

time we do enter upon

the journal this 7th day of March 1979.
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xau •»•*• of the House Journal, dated
Saturday, March 7, 1991 (attached).

March 7,1979

Day 69
Garff
Garr
Harmer
Harward

Nielsen
Olsen
Palmer
Parkin

1513
Whitesides
Wilcox
Speaker Hansen

Absent or not voting: Representatives:
Arrington
Brockbank
Farnsworth
Harrison
Jorgensen
Leavitt

LeFevre
Pace
Patterson
Peterson, C.
Peterson, G.

Rogers
Selleneit
Smith
Watt
Wimmer

H.C.R. No. 9 transmitted to the Senate for its action.

MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS
On motion of Representative Bangerter, the House voted to
advance Substitute S.B. No. 245. UMITATIONS • HABEAS
CORPUS AND POST-CONVICTION AND REMEDIES, to the
head of the third reading calendar.

CONSIDERATION OF SENATE BILL
ON THIRD READING
Substitute S.B. No. 245, LIMITATIONS-H ABE AS CORPUS
AND POST-CONVICTION AND REMEDIES, read the third Ume
and placed on its final passage.
Substitute S.B. No. 245 then passed on the following roll call:
Yeas, 55; Nays, 5; Absent or not voting, 16.
Those voting in the affirmative were: Representatives:

1514
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Allred
Arrington
Atwood
Bangerter
Brown
Cannon
Christensen
Christiansen
Davis
Dmitrich
Doane
Evans
Farnsworth
Florez
Free
Garff
Garr
Harmer
Harrison

Heslop
Hollingshaus
Humberstone
Irvine
Johnson
Judd
Knowlton
Leavitt
LeFevre
McAllister
McKeachnie
McMullin
Mecham
Money
Olsen
Pace
Palmer
Parkin

Day 59
Peterson, C.
Peterson, G.
Peterson, L.
Redd
Reese
Richards
Rowe
Saunders
Schmutz
Selleneit
Smith
Starr
Stephens
Sykes
Wahlstrom
White, J.
Wilcox
Speaker Hansen

Those voting in the negative were: Representatives:
Bishop
Harward

Hoi brook
Strong

Whitesides

Absent or not voting: Representatives:
Brockbank
Fox
Gardner
Hawkes
Jones

Jorgensen
Livingston
Nielsen
Patterson
Rawson

Rogers
Taylor
Watt
White, B.
Wimmer

Substitute S.B. No. 245 was signed by the Speaker in open
session, in the presence of the House, and forwarded to the
Senate for the signature of the President, enrolling and
transmission to the Governor.

MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS

